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Seligson: Insurance

Insurance
by Robert A. Seligson*

Insurance Defense Counsel-His Obligations and Rights
Possibly the most important decision in the insurance field
in 1968 involved not the rights and obligations of an insurance
carrier per se but rather those of an attorney selected by the
carrier to protect and defend its insured. In Lysick v.
Walcom,l the appellate court held that an attorney who is
employed by an insurance company to defend an action arising
out of an accident involving an insured represents both the
insured and the insurer and owes to both a high duty of care
imposed both by statute and the rules governing professional
conduct.
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1. 258 Cal. App.2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr.
406 (1968). For a further discussion of
this case, see Moreau, TORTS, in this
volume.
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Where a conflict of interest arises between the insured and
the insurer the attorney is not necessarily required to withdraw
from the case, or terminate his relationship with one client or
the other, although he may choose to do so. He may represent
dual interests as long as there is full consent and full disclosure. Where counsel represents two clients of conflicting
or divergent interests, he must disclose all facts and circumstances which, in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill
and capacity, are necessary to enable his clients to make free
and intelligent decisions regarding the subject matter of the
representation. The attorney is liable to the client who suffers
loss caused by the failure of the attorney to make full disclosure. An insurer is required to exercise good faith in settling a claim where there is great risk of recovery beyond
the policy limits and where settlement is the most reasonable
manner of disposing of the claim. This rule however applies
to the insurance company and not to the attorney, who is not
a party to the insurance contract. His obligations are governed by the established standards of professional ethics, which
have as their guideposts the elements of good faith and fidelity
to his client. The attorney may be employed with respect
to all matters associated with the claim, or he may be employed
solely for the defense in court. Where the attorney properly
represents only the insurance company in the matter of settlement, it is his duty to make that clear to the insured. If he
does so, he has no obligation to give proper consideration to
the interests of the insured in his recommendations with respect
to the settlement of the case. However, where counsel does
not advise the insured that he is acting solely for the insurer
in the matter of settlement, his duty includes the representation of the insured in that respect, including the obligation
to attempt to effectuate a reasonable settlement as the most
reasonable manner of disposing of the action.
In Lysick the court held that counsel, who had not limited
his obligation to the insured in the manner set forth above,
was negligent as a matter of law: (1) in failing to notify the
insured of settlement offers and demands; (2) in failing to
take positive and timely steps to urge and advise the insurer
to make settlement to the full amount of the policy; and (3) in
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/18
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failing to advise the insured of action which the insured might
take. The court reversed judgment for defendant with directions to re-try the single issue of proximate cause. The court
noted that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could determine that the conduct of the attorney was not a
proximate cause of the damage caused to the insured by
reason of the failure of the insurer to settle the claim within
policy limits. It was further stated that the sole proximate
cause of the insured's loss could have been the breach of duty
of good faith on the part of the insurer, where the insurer
withheld the authority to settle the claim for policy limits
until it was too late for the insured to pay any settlement
proposal offered some months before trial and gave equivocal
instructions regarding settlement to the attorney at various
times prior to trial.
The writer believes that this case is important for the courses
which the court indicated that defense counsel may now follow.
(Caveat, however: following the court of appeal's decision,
the case was settled; and the supreme court may not agree with
either the Lysick decision or this writer's interpretation of that
decision.) Where there is a coverage problem, and the company has hired two counsel-one for the coverage problem
and one to defend the injury action-counsel defending the
injury action may limit his obligation by advising both the
insurer and the insured that he will not take part in settlement negotiations. Counsel representing the insurer in the
coverage dispute may and should handle the settlement negotiations, so as to remove counsel defending the injury case
from what at best is an embarrassing, although permissible
situation.
Where there is no coverage problem and only one defense
attorney is involved, then counsel may limit his authority and
obligation by advising the insured that he represents only the
insurer with respect to settlement negotiations. The insured
should certainly be told that he may and probably should, at
his own expense, retain counsel to advise him with respect
to the question of settlement. Of course, counsel must keep
the insured fully informed concerning negotiations, so that
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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the insured may take whatever action he deems proper to
protect his own interests.
Automobile Insurance

Exclusions of Specifically Named Individuals

For a number of years the California courts and legislature
have engaged in a continuing battle over the right of automobile liability insurance carriers to limit their coverage with
respect to persons using the vehicle with the owner's permission. This struggle was initiated by the supreme court's
decision in Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. CO.,2
where the court held that public policy required that coverage
be afforded to permissive users. Following this landmark
decision, which among other results invalidated class exclusions such as those purporting to exclude drivers under and
over certain ages 3 and use exclusions,4 the legislature made
several attempts to alter, modify and repeal the rule of the
Wildman case. 5 However, the court so construed the legislative amendments as to render them ineffective. 6 This was
accomplished through the technique of statutory construction;
and certainly the language chosen by the legislature could
have been more precise and to the point.
In 1963, however, practitioners in the field honestly felt
that the legislature had explicitly set forth the policy of the
state in terms which even the courts could not deny. In that
year the requirements for a non-certified motor vehicle liability policy, that is the normal automobile policy issued to the
great preponderance of the public,7 were removed from the
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2. 48 Cal.2d 31, 307 P.2d 359
(1957).
3. See American Automobile Ins. Co.
v. Republic Indemnity Co., 52 Cal.2d
507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959); Cassin v.
Financial Indemnity Co., 160 Cal. App.
2d 631, 325 P.2d 228 (1958).
4. See Exchange Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal.2d 613, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 364 P.2d 833 (1961).
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etc. Southern Cal v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
58 Cal.2d 142, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 373
P.2d 640 (1962).
7. A certified policy is one that is
issued following an accident to satisfy
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Vehicle Code and placed in the Insurance Code; and Insurance Code section 11580.1 was adopted which specifically
provided in subsection (e):
Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions, the insurer
and any named insured may, by the terms of such policy
or by a separate writing, agree that coverage under the
policy shall not apply while said motor vehicles are being
used by a natural person or persons designated by name.
Such agreement by any named insured shall be binding
upon every insured to whom such policy applies.
Thus, it was thought that while, generally speaking, a motor
vehicle liability policy had to provide coverage for permissive
users, the insurer and the named insured could agree that
coverage would not be afforded under the policy for "a natural person or persons designated by name." This was designed to cover the situation where the carrier might be perfectly willing to cover the parents but was unwilling to voluntarily grant coverage to the wild teenage son who was known
to be a bad risk. If the son wanted coverage, he would
presumably have to obtain coverage through the Assigned
Risk Plan.
The case of Abbott v. Interinsurance ExchangeS demonstrated once again the refusal of the courts to allow any watering down of the Wildman principle. Mr. and Mrs. Abbott
had a policy with Interinsurance Exchange which covered
the automobile in question. However, their son "had previously had difficulties with his driving and the parents had
signed an endorsement added to the policy which stated that
the insurance would not be effective while their son was using
the car in question."9 As might be expected, they nevertheless permitted their son to use the car; and an accident occurred. The court held that the endorsement was against
public policy, notwithstanding Insurance Code section
11580.1 (e); and that the company was required to defend
the requirements of the Financial Responsibility Laws contained in Vehicle
Code §§ 16250-16503.
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the Abbots and pay the possible judgment in favor of the
injured third party. Then, in an amazing piece of legal reasoning, the court held that if the company had to pay the injured
person, it was entitled to be indemnified by Mr. and Mrs.
Abbott.
The supreme court denied a hearing in the Abbott case;
and, accordingly, the decision became final. The decision
could make it more difficult for parents with teenage children
to obtain automobile insurance in this State; and individuals
who are good risks themselves and were formerly able to
obtain coverage at regular rates might have to resort to the
Assigned Risk Plan because of the risk presented by their
children. Companies which were still willing to issue coverage might have second thoughts about extending more than
the minimum required coverage. Finally, parents who had
limited statutory liability under Vehicle Code sections 17151
and 17709 could conceivably find their life savings wiped out
because of their obligation to indemnify the insurer for the
full amount paid out to the injured party.
In this last connection, it should be noted that parents
would have to face the following dilemna: If they wanted and
were able to obtain large limits to cover the risk of their driving, they would have to indemnify the carrier for the entire
loss if their child had an accident. On the other hand, if they
wished to restrict the amount of their indemnity liability to
their statutory obligations, they might be compelled to accept
minimum limits which would not adequately cover them for
their own accidents. Perhaps, however, this difficult decision
will not be imposed on people confronted with the problem of
a bad risk in the family. Following Abbott, the legislature
was swift to react; and it amended Insurance Code section
11580.1 (e) to provide:
Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions or the provisions of Article 2 (commencing with Section 16450),
Chapter 3, Division 7 of the Vehicle Code, the insurer
and any named insured may, by the terms of such policy
or by a separate writing, agree that coverage under the
policy shall not apply, nor accrue to the benefit of the inhttp://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/18
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sured or any third party claimant, while said motor ve-

hicles are being used by a natural person or persons
designated by name. Such agreement by any named insured shall be binding upon every insured to whom such
policy applies and upon every third party claimant.
The object of this amendment is quite clear-namely; to
nullify the result of the Abbott case and restore to insurers
what the legislature felt that it had provided in 1963, the right
to exclude a person or persons designated by name. However,
in view of the long history of action and counteraction by
our courts and legislature, it remains to be seen whether the
1968 amendment will be honored and applied in the courts of
this State.
Cancellation of Policy

The public's complaints about unwarranted and unreasonable cancellation of automobile liability insurance policies
have resulted in considerable legislation restricting the right of
carriers to cancel such policies. In 1968 the legislature repealed the former law on this subject and adopted new sections
660-667 of the Insurance Code. Among other things, this
legislation provides that any policy which has been in effect
for more than 60 days, may be cancelled only for nonpayment
of premium or the suspension or revocation of the driver's
license or motor vehicle registration of the named insured or
any other operator who either resides in the same household or
customarily operates an automobile insured under the policy.
Section 663 contains restrictions and requirements upon the
insurer which does not desire to renew the policy. Section 665
requires that the company notify the named insured of his
possible eligibility for insurance through the Assigned Risk
Plan.
Hopefully, these restrictions will curb abuses which may
have existed in the past. The writer wonders when the Legislature will enact similar legislation with respect to fire insurance policies. The public cannot condone the wholesale or
even widespread cancellation of fire policies in ghetto areas.
Reasonable regulations should be adopted to insure that the
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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owner of property has the coverage which he needs and which
he thought he had obtained. If the carrier has agreed to furnish a three or five year policy, it should not be permitted carte
blanche to cancel the policy without sufficient and socially
acceptable reasons. In the absence of such justification, such
as non-payment of premium or increase in risk through change
in conditions over which the owner has control, the insurer
should be bound to honor the commitment it made when it
accepted the risk and issued the policy.
Uninsured Motorist Coverage

Uninsured motorist cases accounted, as usual, for a great
number of decisions. Several of these cases involved the question of whether or not the court or the arbitrator should determine if the insured automobile had any physical contact
with the alleged phantom vehicle, which is a prerequisite for
coverage under Insurance Code section 11580.2 (b). The
decisions appear to be hopelessly in conflict.
In Page v. Insurance Company of North America/o plaintiff sued his own uninsured motorist carrier, alleging that in a
three-car collision, a car driven by a Doe caused Pickell
to collide with plaintiff's vehicle. Judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer was affirmed. The court
rejected plaintiff's argument that the Doe car was an "uninsured motor vehicle", since Insurance Code section 11580.2
(b) requires physical contact with the automobile whose owner
or operator is unknown. In the absence of such contact, mere
proximate causation is insufficient. Yet, in Esparza v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company/l the court reversed an order denying arbitration of an uninsured motorist
claim notwithstanding that both the policy and Insurance
Code section 11580.2(b) required "physical contact" with
respect to a "hit and run automobile" and there was no
physical contact between the two cars. The court held
that the arbitration provision of the policy was "a broad agreement to arbitrate the liability of the insurance company to its

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/18
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insured and that the question whether the insured could recover in the absence of contact with the hit and run vehicle
was itself an issue subject to arbitration. This case appears
to be in conflict with Farmers v. Ruiz/ 2 Key Insurance Exchange v. Biagini/ 3 and Commercial Insurance Company v.
Copeland,14 which held that the only issues to be determined
by arbitration are (1) the liability of the uninsured motorist
to the insured and (2) damages. Esparza was then followed
in American Insurance Company v. Gernand/ 5 where it was
held that the trial court had erred in granting a preliminary injunction restraining arbitration where it found no physical
contact between the unidentified vehicle and either the insured
vehicle or a third vehicle. Once again, this was held to be an
issue for the arbitrator. But in Pacific Automobile Insurance
Company v. Lang/ 6 the court held in line with the Copeland
and Ruiz cases that the trial court had erred in accepting the
arbitrator's determination as to physical contact. It was a
question for the court to determine whether the arbitrator had
jurisdiction to proceed; and the court should have made its
own factual determination of this matter.
Under these decisions, there appears to be ample authority
for whatever position one wants to take. Hopefully, the supreme court will resolve this conflict in the near future.
The legislature also addressed itself to the subject of uninsured motorist coverage. As reported in last year's volume,
in Lopez v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company/7 the court
struck down a provision excluding from uninsured motorist
coverage a relative who owned an automobile. The court
held this provision to be void as conflicting with the applicable
statute, stating that the argument that it was reasonable to
exclude one who did not insure his own car "would better be
addressed to the Legislature." This suggestion was accepted;
and, accordingly, Insurance Code section 11580.2 was
12.
Rptr.
13.
Rptr.
14.
Rptr.
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amended to provide that uninsured motorist coverage does not
apply "to bodily injury of an insured while occupying a motor
vehicle owned by an insured, unless the occupied vehicle is an
insured motor vehicle."
No longer may one obtain uninsured motorist coverage
for all his cars by paying the premium for only one automobile.
Homeowner's Insurance

Pacific Employers Revisited

In Cal Law Trends and Developments-i967, this writer
discussed at some length the supreme court's decision in Pacific Employers insurance Company v. Maryland Casualty
Company/8 and pointed out that following that decision, numerous claims had been made that homeowner's policies,
which offered what was thought to be limited automobile
coverage for the "premises and the ways immediately adjoining" were, by virtue of the legal legerdemain utilized in the
opinion, converted into automobile policies furnishing coverage for accidents occurring miles away from the insured's
premises. In the past year, superior courts throughout the
state refused to accept these claims and held instead that
homeowner's policies, intended primarily as protection for
household risks, do not afford coverage for automobile accidents away from the home.
At the present time, the writer knows of eleven superior
court decisions in favor of the homeowner's carrier. Most of
these decisions have gone to the nitty-gritty of contract law,
the intention of the parties; and they have refused to impose
coverage that was not bargained for and for which no premium
was paid. In so doing, the writer believes that the courts have
followed the supreme court's admonition in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage/ 9 in which Chief Justice Traynor declared:
In this state, however, the intention of the parties as ex-
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pressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights
and duties. A court must ascertain and give effect to
this intention by determining what the parties meant by
the words they used. 20
At this writing, there is no California appellate court decision on the subject; but if the intention of the parties is to be
determined, honored and applied, the writer feels that the
superior court rulings will be affirmed and coverage will not be
imposed upon the homeowner's carrier which neither underwrote the risk of automobiles away from the premises nor collected a premium for such risk.
Finally, it should be noted that here too the legislature has
taken action. In 1968 subsection (g) was added to Insurance
Code section 11580.1 to provide:
Nothing in this section nor in Section 16057 or 16450
of the Vehicle Code shall be construed to constitute a
homeowner's policy as an 'automobile liability policy'
within the meaning of Section 16057 of said code nor
as a 'motor vehicle liability policy' within the meaning
of Secton 16450 of said code, notwithstanding that such
homeowner's policy may provide automobile or motor
vehicle liability coverage on insured premises or the ways
immediately adjoining. For the purposes of this section,
'homeowner's policy' means an insurance policy providing fire and other insurances covering either residence
properties occupied by not more than four families and
appurtenances, or the contents thereof other than merchandise, or both.
Certainly, for cases arising after the effective date of the
statute, this should solve the problem. As to cases arising
prior to the statute, it should be noted that while the statute
does not provide that it is retroactive, it does purport to be
a statute of construction and also appears to announce that
public policy does not require holding a homeowner's policy
to be an automobile policy for accidents away from the home.
20. 69 Cal.2d at - , 69 Cal. Rptr. at
564, 442 P.2d at 644.
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Fire Insurance

After what appears to have been considerable debate, the
supreme court handed down its long-awaited decision on
re-hearing in Reichert v. General Insurance Company of
America. l The assured claimed that because of the refusal
of his fire insurance carriers to promptly adjust and settle his
loss due to a fire, he lost possession of his property and was
subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt. He sued not just for
the fire damage to his motel but also for all consequential
damage flowing from the breach as well as punitive damages.
In its initial opinion, the court held that the complaint stated
a cause of action and that demurrers had been wrongfully sustained without leave to amend. However, the court then
granted a re-hearing; and by a 4-3 decision reversed itself
and held that plaintiff's causes of action constituted "rights
of action arising under contract" which passed to plaintiff's
trustee in bankruptcy, so plaintiff had no right to assert such
claims himself.
In a strong dissent, Justice Peters takes issue with the
technical basis of the majority's decision and also discusses
the substantive question with which the majority did not deal,
namely, whether an insured may recover damages caused by
bankruptcy which result from the wrongful conduct of an
insurer in failing to pay a fire loss. Justices Peters, Tobriner, and Mosk give an emphatic "yes" to that question in
language reminiscent of Justice Peters' opinion in Crisci v.
Security Insurance Company.2 In compelling language, which
the writer feels will be accepted as the law of this state in
time to come, the dissenting justices state:
Where the owner of a heavily mortgaged motel or other
business property suffers a substantial fire loss, the owner
may be placed in financial distress, may be unable to
meet his mortgage payments, and may be in jeopardy
of losing his property and becoming a bankrupt. A
1. 68 Cal.2d 822, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321,
442 P.2d 377 (1968). For a further
discussion of this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this volume.
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major, if not the main, reason why a businessman purchases fire insurance is to guard against such eventualities
if his property is damaged by a fire. Certainly, the property owner who purchases fire insurance may reasonably
expect that if a fire occurs, the insurance proceeds will be
promptly available to protect him from those eventualities. The business of the fire insurer is to provide
such protection. Insurers are, of course, chargeable
with knowledge of the basic reasons why fire insurance
is purchased, and of the likelihood that an improper
delay in payment may result in the very injuries for
which the insured sought protection by purchasing the
policies. 3
The dissent also points out that money is not always available in the market and that consequential damages are not
always too remote to be proximately caused by a delay in payment. Certainly, tight money conditions existing in recent
times demonstrate that that is true; and the writer believes
that the fire insurance carrier which wrongfully refuses to
promptly pay a legitimate fire claim may find that its exposure is far greater than the amount of the damage to the
property.
Comprehensive Liability Policy: Products Hazard Exclusion
The advent and increase in products liability cases have
brought with them corresponding problems in insurance law.
In the past year, the Supreme Court decided an important case
dealing with the "products hazard" exclusion found in most
comprehensive general liability policies. In Insurance Company of North America v. Electronic Purification Company,4
the insured was engaged in the business of selling, leasing and
installing water purification machines, called Nion Generators.
It leased a Nion Generator to a motel for one year. Prior
to the installation by the insured's part-time employee, the
3. 68 Cal.2d at 849, 69 Cal. Rptr.
at 337, 442 P.2d at 393.
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insured suggested that the motel pool be acid-washed to rid
it of algae. While so washing the pool, the insured's employee replaced an underwater light. Upon completion, the
employee installed the Nion Generator, filled the pool with
water and left the job. The next day a small boy was fatally
injured from an electric shock. A wrongful death complaint
was filed against the insured and the motel owners, alleging
that they negligently, carelessly and recklessly installed the
electric wiring leading to the submerged light fixture. The insured's comprehensive multiple liability policy contained
"products hazard" exclusions for (1) products manufactured,
sold, handled or distributed by the insured and (2) completed
operations.
The court found the exclusions inapplicable on two grounds.
Initially, the "products" exclusion did not apply to property
that had been rented, rather than sold, to others. The
"operations" exclusion was to be read in conjunction with
the "products" exclusion and was, therefore, also inapplicable
to products which had been rented. Alternatively, noting
that the electrocution may have occurred from negligence in
the acid-washing and installation of the flood lights, the court
felt that it was not the intent of the insured to exclude coverage for this service found to be independent of the installation
of the Nion Generator. In noting that a liberal interpretation
of the "completed operations" exclusion would destroy the
insured's principal objective in purchasing insurance, the court
sounded a clarion call for clarity in insurance policies, stating:
The instant case presents yet another illustration of the
dangers of the present complex structuring of insurance
policies. Unfortunately the insurance industry has become addicted to the practice of building into policies
one condition or exception upon another in the shape of a
linguistic Tower of Babel. We join other courts in
decrying a trend which both plunges the insured into a
state of uncertainty and burdens the judiciary with the
task of resolving it. We reiterate our plea for clarity and
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/18
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simplicity in policies that fulfill so important a public
service. 5
As one who has wrestled with language inserted into policies
by people who obviously never try cases dealing with the words
they use, the writer joins Justice Tobriner in his plea for
clarity and simplicity. On the other hand, the writer decries
those decisions where ambiguity is sought and found simply
as a vehicle for a desired result. In the words of an ancient
Chinese seer, "ambiguity lies in the eyes of the beholder and
some people are blind."
5. 67 Cal.2d at 691, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 390, 433 P.2d at 182.
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